| INTRODUCTION
Within the last century, humanity has faced three devastating human influenza pandemics: H1N1 in 1918, H2N2 in 1957 and H3N2 in 1968. 1 Collectively, these three pandemics are estimated to have resulted in approximately 46 million deaths and over 500 million infections. 2 In recent decades, the rate of emergence of zoonotic influenza A serotypes in humans has increased, supporting the consensus that a future influenza pandemic of zoonotic origin is on the horizon. [3] [4] [5] In 1996, a novel serotype, H5N1, was isolated from a goose in Hong
Kong with the first human cases (n=18) being recorded following exposure to poultry in 1997. 6 Since official World Health Organization from avian species. 7 However, small clusters of un-sustained humanto-human transmission have been documented in rural areas with low population density. [8] [9] [10] [11] As a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus with unprecedented endemicity in birds and high mortality, many have postulated that H5N1 may be the source of the next human influenza pandemic. [12] [13] [14] Unlike past pandemics, the ease of international travel in the modern age means that viruses can spread around the globe in a very rapid timeframe 15, 16 ; the 2009 pandemic of swineorigin H1N1(H1N1pdm09) is a testament to the ongoing risk of emerging infections in a globalized world. While the total burden of 
| HEMAGGLUTININ RECEPTOR SPECIFICITY-A CRITICAL RISK FACTOR FOR PANDEMIC EMERGENCE
It is understood that the host range of avian influenza viruses is partially determined by the binding specificity of the hemagglu- is necessary that mutations alter the specificity from avian α2,3-linked sialic acid (α2,3-SA) receptors found in the avian intestinal tract, 34, 35 to mammalian α2,6-linked (α2,6-SA) receptors located on the epithelial cells of the human upper respiratory tract.
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Crystal structure studies have revealed a widening of the RBS in mammalian-adapted HA to facilitate binding to the larger α2,6-SA cis-linked receptors. 42, 43 HA receptor specificity is considered the third-most important predictor of pandemic emergence following (i) human infection and (ii) airborne transmission in animal models according to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Influenza Risk
Assessment Tool (IRAT), which also incorporates the results of GOF research. 44 Other viral factors such as improved polymerase efficiency and HA pH activation are similarly necessary for efficient human-to-human transmission, but are not alone sufficient for colonization and therefore considered less significant. Therefore, focusing research efforts towards potentially pandemic H5-HA mutations appears justified. Numerous GOF studies have identified additional mutants of pandemic concern, a summary of which is aggregated by the CDC 55 and others. 21 Translation of these mutants of concern into predictors of pandemic emergence has since been upheld as an informative tool for current public health surveillance and preparedness efforts: to-date, the results of GOF research have been used to inform pandemic influenza surveillance activities as well as efforts in pandemic preparedness planning and response in parts of Asia and the Middle East.
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| APPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RISK IN GOF RESEARCH
Following an outbreak of H5N1 in Cambodia in 2013 that totalled 26 human cases and 14 deaths, 58 the CDC rapidly deployed a response team to conduct control measures and epidemiological investigations.
Here it was determined that many cases had become infected with strains naturally possessing GOF genotypes partially matched to the laboratory transmissible strain. 59 Following the initial CDC investigation, the WHO coordinated the development of a candidate vaccine.
However, as the roll out of a matched vaccine is 3-6 months at a minimum using current technology in embryonated eggs, 60 there could not have been enough time to materially impact the epidemic peak. Other mitigation measures such as antivirals, personal protective equipment (PPE) and non-pharmaceutical interventions are more critical in the early pandemic phase. However, the rapid response in Cambodia is thought to have reduced the possible time-to-market by at least a month notwithstanding the impact of immediate control measures employed. 56 It was later determined that no human-to-human transmission had occurred, and that the mutant strains had arisen following human infection rather than a precursor virus in poultry. Yet at the time, the precautionary principle was invoked to prevent a potential pandemic. Whether the intervention prevented a pandemic, however, cannot be proven. Beyond this specific case, the results of H5N1 GOF studies have been supported as one method to improve our understanding of other avian influenza viruses in the wild such as H7N9, considering many of the experimental GOF mutants identified are currently circulating in nature. 53, 54 However, the predictive value of GOF mutants is not without its 61 This evidence undermines the value and generalizability of molecular surveillance activities based on the results of GOF studies to currently circulating strains.
Gain-of-function research also poses significant risk to the greater global community as dual-use research of concern (DURC), that is, research that is intended for good, but either through accidental or intentional misuse can cause significant harm to human health.
Opponents of GOF research argue the threat of potential laboratory accidents sparking an unnatural pandemic or bioterrorism arising from the publication and replication of GOF methodologies is unacceptable. Specifically, GOF research cannot materially impact epidemic control such as through the development of a pre-pandemic vaccine, 62 nor does it increase the certainty of risk estimates for molecular surveillance purposes in which it has been proposed as shown above.
A further point is the difficulty many experts have in distinguishing between natural vs unnatural disease events meaning accidental or deliberate outbreaks may go unrecognized. 60 have both conducted risk-benefit analyses on GOF research yet neither have been conclusive on the matter.
| CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the net-benefit argument supporting GOF research can be considered unjustified because the utility of GOF studies as a tool for pandemic risk assessment and surveillance activities is uncertain, while the overwhelming health risks to the greater global community due to the threat of unnatural pandemics and bioterrorism remain.
Better risk assessment needs to be done. GOF research has proven useful in its purely scientific achievement of identifying the relationship between genotype and phenotype in vivo. Yet the limited generalizability of GOF research to the surveillance of currently circulating strains supports the need for further research into universal predictors of pandemic emergence. Alternative approaches to pandemic risk modelling have been proposed which are worth exploring, such as identifying molecular determinants of HA evolution. 66 For example, studies have shown the protein structure of avian HA partially determines the mutation rate within the RBS and thus, greater opportunities for selection towards human respiratory cells, increasing risk. 67, 68 Additionally, investing in greater diagnostic capacity to support surveillance systems, improving response plans for non-pharmaceutical interventions and stockpiling antivirals and PPE are equally important during both the pre-and early pandemic phases. 69 
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